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Assessing violent nonstate actorness in global politics:
a framework for analysis
Ersel Aydinli
Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
Abstract This article begins with the assumption that the most important shift that is
taking place in contemporary global politics is the shift in polity power from the
predominance of the state to the rising importance of nonstate actors. It goes on to argue
that disciplinary understandings of this shift and, in particular, the nature of the actors
driving it, remain dispersed. This article aims, therefore, to provide a framework for
evaluating the global political potential—or actorness—of one type of nonstate actor, the
violent nonstate actor, positing it as that most overtly challenging states’ authority, and
therefore with the potential to play a uniquely stimulating role in the shifting of power.
Based on three principles of autonomy, representation and influence, the framework
provides broad criteria for understanding violent nonstate actors, as well as a means for
evaluating violent nonstate actorness and for exploring its potential in global politics.
How important are nonstate actors? Well, one nonstate actor, the Jihadists, with the
help of another nonstate actor, Fox TV, were able to bring the great American
superpower into a war against all kinds of other shadowy nonstate actors. I guess
that answers the question.
—Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, May 2011, Ankara, Turkey
Introduction
Power in global politics is shifting in at least two distinct ways. The first is in a
geographical sense, with power moving from certain traditionally strong states or
regions, such as the West, or Europe, to other states and regions, for example, the
East, or Eurasia. Equally interesting though is a parallel shift in the power of
polities (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996; Ferguson et al 2000), in other words, from
statehood to nonstatehood, or from the predominance of the state as the primary
pillar to which international relations has been both practically and conceptually
bound, to the rising importance and centrality of nonstate actors and transnational
relations (see, for example, Held et al 1999; Mathews 1997).
Both shifts signal major transformations, but the latter is arguably more
dramatic in terms of the effect it is having on the nature of global politics.
Geographical shifts still constitute changes taking place within the state system, so
although the names of the dominant actors may be altered, the basic
understanding of practices and behaviours can be expected to remain more or
less similar. A polity shift, however, is a substantially different kind of change,
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with potential affects that we still know relatively little about. Not only are the
numbers and types of actors proliferating beyond states, but, with these new
actors’ increasing involvement in transnational politics, most of the principal
traditional concepts and patterns of relations can no longer be counted on as
building blocks for scholarly enquiry or speculation. For example, a concept such
as anarchy, upon which so much of modern international relations scholarship
was built up, may be seeing a qualitative change to a form that is more raw and,
indeed, ‘anarchic’ than in past understandings; nonstate actors may not react in
predictable ways to traditional state behaviours, such as to acts of deterrence; and
it remains unclear what happens to classic patterns of alliances or balancing when
nonstates begin to take a role.
Even though such a shift has occurred before in the not-so-distant past,1 our
understandings of what it means, the context in which it is occurring, and the
nature of the actors driving it, remain dispersed and in that sense, limited. The
starting point to understanding the shift lies in further conceptualization of its
primary actors—nonstates. For international relations, the ‘state’, and the (fairly)
common understanding of what it was and what it meant, has long provided a
pillar around which scholarly inquiry could be built up. Whether in a positive or
negative sense, whether the state is your punching bag or your mainstay, it has
provided some kind of clarity and a reference point against which or to which
scholarship can refer. When it comes to nonstate actors, however, we have far less
comprehensive research on what they are, how they interact and how they may be
changing over time. If we accept that a polity shift is occurring, wemust develop a
deeper understanding of this form of agency. Only with such understandings can
we begin fully to analyse the implications of this shift for our existing knowledge
of global affairs, from the implications for basic concepts like anarchy or
sovereignty, to those for basic patterns and practices, such as alliance building or
power transitions.
This article aims, therefore, to provide a framework for discussing the
potential role in global politics of one particular form of nonstate actor. Violent
nonstate actors, many of which are the most overt challengers to state authority
and dominant position in world affairs, may have a uniquely stimulating role to
play in the shifting of polity power, and therefore are the focus of this framework.
By providing broad criteria for understanding and evaluating violent nonstate
actors, the article ultimately intends to provide a means for assessing violent
nonstate actorness and for exploring its potential in global politics.
Understanding violent nonstate actors in global politics
Research on the transnational realm and a polity shift towards nonstate actors
(NSA), is often still very much statist inspired, in the sense that its ultimate aim
has been to explore the possible declining role of the state (Avant et al 2010;
Slaughter 2004). Given that goal, it is ironic that in these works there has generally
been less attention paid to the violent NSAs which in many cases may pose the
1 If we look back to pre-Westphalian days we see evidence of a similar polity shift in
reverse, with the gradual decline of the feudal system (of largely autonomous actors) and
the increasing consolidation of actors into what would become states (Osiander 2001).
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most direct challenges to state authority. This tendency may be because the
authors of these works are more likely to come from a liberal strand of
international relations theorizing, and thus their attention is drawn to the more
benign agents of a new global governance, such as transnational activists
(Cunningham 2001; Landolt and Goldring 2010; Tarrow 2005; 2007), advocacy
networks (Bloodgood 2010; Keck and Sikkink 1998) and NGOs (Armstrong et al
2010; Holzscheiter 2005; Arts et al 2001). Or perhaps because many others have
approached the issue of declining state power from an economic perspective (for
example, Kahler and Lake 2003; Hart and Prakash 2000) and the specific role of
‘private authority’ (Cutler et al 1999)—a concept that others (Hall and Biersteker
2002; Katsikas 2011) have, admittedly, attempted to expand beyond its more
peaceful elements to include its ‘illicit’ forms. The challenge to state power is also
frequently considered from a legal perspective (for example, Maragia 2002;
Noortmann 2002; Noortmann and Ryngaert 2010; Young 2010), but still without a
particular focus on violent NSAs.
If those works have tended to emphasize the broader questions of whether
and, if so, how NSAs, violent or not, are exhibiting increasing significance in
global politics, other works have chosen to focus specifically on the violence that is
associated with a portion of these power challengers, basically questioning why,
when and how these new actors in global politics choose to use violent methods
(Chenoweth and Lawrence 2010; Kalyvas 2010; Weinstein 2007). There are
discussions about the change in the very concept of warfare that can be associated
with the introduction of new powerful actors (Kaldor 1999) as well as changes in
the ways such actors affect how wars and international crises are dealt with
(Mishali-Ram 2009). Still others have drawn on the extensive domestic political
literature on insurgents and rebellion when looking more pointedly at violent
examples of NSAs, or nonstate armed groups (Krause and Milliken 2009), and
how they are interacting both with states (for example, Mulaj 2010; Salehyan 2010;
Salehyan et al 2011) and within the larger environment (for example, Adamson
2005) to mobilize strength and project power. Yet a further body of work looking at
violent NSAs can be found in certain subfields of international relations such as
terrorism studies (for example, Sageman 2004) or policy-based works on
transnational criminal groups (for example, Williams 2008; Williams and Savona
1996).
One thing that is evident from the varied literature on NSAs is that apparently
obvious concepts are not always easy to define. Stepping back from nonstate
actors, it has even proven controversial to attempt to define ‘state’, with a
tendency to rely on ‘sovereignty’ or ‘power’ as ways of determining statehood
(Paul et al 2003), and resulting in a large literature distinguishing between
different types of states, from weak to strong (for example, Migdal 1988), or from
quasi to failing and beyond (for example, Call 2011; Jackson 2000). Unsurprisingly,
therefore, defining ‘nonstate’, and identifying what does or does not constitute an
NSA, has proven equally challenging. Indeed, existing definitions seem to reflect
the diversity of the definers’ own research interests or background, from
Huntington’s (1993) defining of ‘civilizations’ as NSAs, Hall and Biersteker’s
(2002) understanding based on types of authority, Josselin and Wallace’s (2001)
definition based on transnationalness, or other scholars’ policy-based perspectives
(Thomas et al 2005; Schulz et al 2004). When it comes to violent NSAs (VNSAs) in
particular, recent works have presented fairly similar typologies outlining five or
A framework for violent nonstate actors 3
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six types, generally divided along the lines of: (1) insurgents, (2) other domestic
militant groups, (3) warlords/urban gangs, (4) private militias/military
companies, (5) terrorists and (6) criminal organizations (Krause and Miliken
2009; Mulaj 2010; Williams 2008). These works all recognize to some degree the
problems involved with defining something primarily on the basis of it not being
something else—a state—particularly when states themselves are not hom-
ogenous, static entities and when the so-called ‘nonstates’ are often very much
intertwined with states. In their efforts to nevertheless try and develop a better
understanding of these actors and their increasing importance, they have created
their typologies, taking into consideration such factors as whether or not the
groups are seeking change or maintenance of the status quo; to what extent they
are profit-driven, what type of organization, identity, goals and purposes they
have, what kind and degree of violence they use and how they recruit their
members.
Such works have been critical in understanding what VNSAs are, and for
providing ways of distinguishing among them. Other works have drawn on such
categorizations and case studies to offer frameworks that would allow for the
evaluating of NSAs’ respective strengths and weaknesses. An early example of
this is Hocking and Smith’s (1990) brief discussion, in which they took three
traditional criteria for measuring state actorness—sovereignty, recognition,
control of territory and people—and adjusted them to make them relevant for
NSAs. Thus, instead of state-defined sovereignty, they wrote of entities having
autonomy, or ‘freedom of action’ when trying to achieve their objectives. In place
of formal recognition, they explored the range of the constituency represented,
and rather than an actor’s control over territory and people, referred to the overall
‘influence’ an actor is able to exert. Arts et al’s (2001) comprehensive edited
volume on NSAs concludes with a typology of NSA ‘mattering’ that distinguishes
between influence at an institutional and a strategic level; the former referring to
NSAs being a part of institutional arrangements in international relations, the
latter to NSAs being able to intervene strategically to affect processes or outcomes
in international politics and law making.
Other approaches to exploring the influence or importance of NSAs over the
years have offered up concrete frameworks for measuring ‘nonstate actorness’,
most of which have been prepared to consider the role of the EU as a
‘supranational’ nonstate entity. These various frameworks all share at least two
primary characteristics for determining actorness: (1) some reference to having a
decision-making and policy-making system or ability (2) and some reference to
having the capacity for implementing the decisions or policies made. Beyond that,
most refer to some starting point of shared interests (Sjo¨sted 1977), a concept that
developed into shared values and principles (Bretherton and Vogler 2006;
Dryburgh 2008) and to the idea of a broader shared identity, including shared
norms, interests and goals (Doidge 2007). Most of these frameworks also include
some description of the need to be recognized by other actors in order to achieve
‘actorness’—sometimes in the legal sense (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Vogler
1999), other times in the sense of requiring ‘credibility’ (Doidge 2007) or in the
more Constructivist sense of needing to be perceived as an actor by others
(Dryburgh 2008). Two of these frameworks include a specific criterion of
‘autonomy’, though because the focus in these works is often on the EU, the
understanding is not in the sense of being separate from states, but rather as an
4 Ersel Aydinli
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entity able to remain autonomous from the individual states of which it is
comprised.
The previous literature has provided critically important and useful ideas for
how to define, categorize and think about VNSAs and their relation with the state,
but existing frameworks that can be applied to assess these actors’ potential role in
global politics are more limited. There remains a need to develop these
frameworks further if they are to be useful for looking at the actorness of
individual NSAs (rather than a ‘nonstate’ umbrella body) and in particular that of
violent NSAs. A framework for defining, understanding, and evaluating VNSAs
needs to assume, for example, a different position on the issue of legal recognition
and credibility, or on the understanding of systems for policy making and
implementation. This article attempts to provide such a framework. The
Autonomy, Representation and Influence (ARI) framework presented below is
aimed specifically at evaluating the global political potential of violent nonstate
actors, defined here as all armed groups that are not fully and directly under the
consistent control of any particular state. ‘VNSA’ includes therefore all of the
groups described above in the various typologies, from insurgents and warlords
to terrorists and transnational criminals.2
While the ARI framework does not constitute a set of exact measurements for
‘qualifying’ as a VNSA with global potential, it does provide common points for
discussing, analysing and comparing the global actorness of different VNSAs.
Evidence of true global actorness potential of a VNSA derives from a combination
of all three primary factors on the ARI. Thus, for example, a VNSA may have
minimal autonomy but high influence (for example, a private military company)
or very high autonomy but low representation and influence (for example, a small
terrorist group), and therefore be judged as having only moderate global
actorness. However, a VNSA that is actively autonomous (see below), maintains a
good balance of representation, and displays both the sustainability and impact
capacity that constitutes influence, has the potential to affect politics and
international relations at a global level.
Conceptualizing VNSAs: the ARI framework
Autonomy
The first criterion in the framework speaks to the essence of nonstate actorness—
the distinction and distance of NSAs in general and VNSAs in particular, from
states. Such an apparent dichotomy between states and nonstates must consider of
course that neither side of the pair is a static entity. States are well known to vary
between stronger and weaker examples, or even to fall at times into
2Although private military groups or companies may seem to remain outside of the
definition, and, indeed, they are not a part of all typologies (Williams (2008, 9), for
example, excludes them for being ‘inherently limited’ since they ‘rarely challenge state
authority and legitimacy’), their more obvious bonds with state governments do not
necessarily rule out their being evaluated with this framework. However, the first
component of the framework, autonomy, when applied to private military companies,
will reveal that this reliance on states for primary funding makes such groups weaker
in terms of their potential global actorness.
A framework for violent nonstate actors 5
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categorizations of quasi or failing states. Similarly, nonstate actorness is not an
either/or concept, but may be seen as moving along a spectrum from relatively
more statist to relatively more nonstatist. Variation for actors along this spectrum
can be attributed to two main factors: the amount of influence states hold over the
actor (does, for example, the VNSA rely on states for any financial or other
support?), and the degree of the actor’s connection with statist principles (for
example, does the VNSA adhere to all/some state norms and regulations or does
it, at the opposite extreme, actively fight against a state or states?). These factors
are discussed here under the headings of distance from the state, and distance
from the state-centric regime (see Table 1).
Distance from the state. With respect to being free from state involvement,
obviously, the fewer ties between a VNSA and individual states, the more
autonomous that VNSA can be considered. Such autonomy in and of itself does
not mean that a VNSA is inherently stronger or has greater potential actorness—a
VNSA may be receiving and thriving on state support—however, the purpose of
considering ‘distance’ from states when evaluating VNSAs’ global potential is to
look at the degree to which a VNSA is beholden to any state. VNSAs may be very
much connected to a state or states. They may receive direct financial or
infrastructural support from a state as in the case of a private military organization
or a terrorist organization using one state’s territory as a base for fighting against a
neighbouring state, or they may simply be tied in the sense that they take
advantage of a state’s shortcomings or grey areas, as in the case of a criminal
network making use of corruption or weakness in a state to bypass restrictions.
But does that VNSA’s existence and continuation depend on that support? To what
extent can the VNSA thrive if the state’s/states’ direct or indirect support is
withdrawn? Obviously in the case of a private military company being hired by a
state, the bond is essential, and thus such a VNSA could be said to have very low
autonomy. But in the case of less direct support, for example, an ethnic terrorist
organization that receives financial or infrastructural support from the target
state’s neighbouring countries, is that VNSA able to find alternative means of
finance or alternative locations from which to conduct their activities if the
neighbouring states cut them off? Evidence of being able to do this would indicate
a comparatively higher degree of autonomy.
A further distinction in ‘degree’ of autonomy can be made between ‘being able
to survive without state support’, and ‘being able to survive state persecution’.
The latter could be considered a distinguishing aspect of VNSA autonomy,
recognizing a distinction between what can be called ‘active’ and ‘passive’
autonomy. Thus, having passive autonomy from the state characterizes those
VNSAs that are to varying degrees able to exist free from state involvement,
whereas active autonomy includes the additional characteristic of the VNSA being
Table 1. Elements of VNSA autonomy
Distance from the state Distance from the international state system
Free from state involvement Being sovereignty-free
Able to survive state persecution
6 Ersel Aydinli
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:2
2 0
7 M
ay
 20
14
 
able to defend itself effectively against statist efforts to defeat it—a feature that
will be discussed in more detail in the framework section on influence. Obviously,
a VNSA’s relationship with states may be accommodative or conflictive, but it is
logical that more conflictive relationships are more likely to require a VNSA to be
more autonomous—both passively and actively. The extent to which the VNSA is
able to succeed at this, to exist if necessary without state support and to survive
statist attempts to crush it, can be considered a sign of its degree of autonomy and
of its potential for global actorness.
Distance from the state-centric regime. Moving beyond the more concrete
understanding of distance from the state in terms of largely financial or
infrastructural support, a VNSA’s degree of autonomy can also be considered
as distance from the overall international ‘legitimate’ system of broadly
recognized state-based institutions and organizations, practices, instruments
and norms, all of which taken together can be labelled as the state-centric
regime. This regime represents the official and generally accepted legal
skeleton of global governance. Parallel to this regime however, is an alternate
one of instruments and practices considered by most in the state-realm to be
illegitimate and illicit; a realm with its own political and financial dimensions
and norms.
A VNSA’s distance from the state-centric regime, and thus its degree of
autonomy, can be considered from two, interrelated perspectives: how well the
VNSA is able to create new and convenient alternative regime instruments and/or
agencies (or take advantage and adapt to existing ones) in order to function, and
how well the VNSA is able to manipulate weaknesses within the state-centric
regime in order to ease its own functioning. Examples of alternative practices
include such things as creating untraceable means for transferring money, using
legal companies to finance illegal operations as in the case of Osama bin Laden’s
legal construction and oil companies that provided funding for the Jihadist
terrorist network, or human trafficking networks’ mastering of the forged
documentation industry. Making use of weaknesses in the state-centric regime has
been discussed at length in works on the use of failing states as platforms for this
type of alternative activity (recent works include Bourne 2011; Silva 2013).
In a sense then, whereas distance from the state refers to how much a VNSA is
beholden to a state or states for support, distance from the state-centric regime
looks at the degree to which the VNSA is beholden to overall statist principles and
practices. To what extent does a VNSA act as a ‘sovereignty-free’ actor—
Rosenau’s (1990) description of actors in the multicentric world. Although they
may be located within the jurisdiction of states, the sovereignty-free actors of the
multicentric world are able to evade the constraints of states and pursue their own
goals. The more efficiently they are able to do this, the more autonomous they can
be considered to be.
Representation
The second criterion for this framework, representation, is based on a similar
premise to one included in earlier nonstate actorness frameworks under various
headings of ‘shared community’ or ‘identity’. In those cases, when the NSA being
analysed was the EU, the question of whether this actor constituted a united body
A framework for violent nonstate actors 7
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:2
2 0
7 M
ay
 20
14
 
of shared interests, values and goals was important for assessing the EU’s ability
to work as an independent actor rather than a diverse conglomeration of
individual states. In the case of VNSAs, having a common identity among
members again serves the essential purpose of creating a relatively unified actor
that can then identify its priorities and policies, but it has the added role of serving
to the group’s own regeneration potential, which is necessary for its survival, and
thus for its ‘actorness’. Unlike states, which generally find that their constituents
naturally regenerate themselves if not even gradually increasing in number, an
NSA, whether violent or not, must both work to maintain its members and to
attract new ones. The first measurement of representation is, therefore: is the
VNSA able to continuously supply constituents to keep itself active and
meaningful? Such regeneration involves both attracting new members as well as
maintaining old ones, and thus assessing a VNSA’s representation capacity
requires not only looking at the various strategies, tactics and technical measures
involved in the actual physical recruitment of new members, but also at critical
factors that may support or limit such recruitment: the scope of potential recruits,
the group’s level of recognition and legitimacy, and its ability to generate loyalty
among its members to keep them committed (see Table 2).
Regeneration
Rather than focus on the technical strategies and tactics for recruiting members to
a VNSA, which are too numerous to list and ever-evolving, we may instead
consider the underlying support mechanisms for recruitment capacity, the first of
which is the scope of potential recruits. A VNSA’s regeneration potential is
automatically limited if the range of possible group members is narrowly defined.
If, for example, the VNSA is, in nature, restricted to a particular ethnic group or a
certain geographical region, the membership boundaries are equally restricted.
If, on the other hand, a VNSA is ideologically defined, whether on the basis of a
religious or political ideology, the pool of potential recruits becomes much larger.
For example, the broadly defined Jihadist network has a greater global actorness
potential based on its recruitment pool and regeneration scope than does a
particular ethnic-based terrorist group like the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK).
The second support mechanism is the building up of recognition and
legitimacy, a factor that also played a prominent role in various earlier
frameworks, but was generally subsumed under actual legal understandings,
which are obviously not the case for most VNSAs. Rather, the VNSA must build
up legitimacy among its members and potential members. As such, the term does not
refer to any kind of qualitative legitimacy among those outside of the group,
Table 2. Elements of VNSA representation
Regeneration
Attracting members Maintaining membership Managing overstretch
(Recruitment strategies)
Building recognition/
establishing legitimacy
Gnerating loyalty Organizational Ideological
8 Ersel Aydinli
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indeed, outsiders aremore likely to scorn—or fear—the VNSA. Legitimacy among
the group’s (potential) constituents refers to a belief in the VNSA’s ability to meet
its members’ needs, be they needs of providing basic security or financial reward,
needs of establishing an independent country, or more philosophical needs like
defending members’ religion or ideology. Such an understanding of legitimacy
can be linked to discussions of how NSAs remain viable entities. As Rosenau
(1990) pointed out, while a state’s existence is maintained by legal status or
sovereignty, actors in the multicentric world have their importance determined by
their capability to initiate and sustain actions. The nature of those actions depends
of course on the nature and scope of the VNSA’s constituency and its goals, but, in
every case, the VNSA has to show the ability to act successfully. Success maymean
making changes in governmental policies, or it may mean overthrowing a
government. For a criminal network, successful recognition and legitimacy for the
constituents may mean providing financial reward and protection. Ultimately, the
VNSA must present itself as a viable alternative representative of, and provider
for, the targeted constituents.
For most VNSAs, achieving such recognition and legitimacy will require the
use of illicit actions. On the mild end of such acts, VNSAs may build legitimacy by
using resources appropriated illicitly from one market to fund legal (for example,
welfare) activities in another. Such acts may allow them to improve their
legitimacy and constituency base by cultivating a ‘Robin Hood’ image in the
recipient areas. Examples include groups as diverse as Hamas, of which the
majority of their activities can be said to be directed at social, welfare and
educational work, to the FARC in Columbia (Hanson 2009), to drug cartels.3
Acts may also occur at the more violent end of the illicit spectrum. The
question of whether violent acts are more or less effective than nonviolent ones in
achieving goals and therefore in building up recognition and legitimacy among
potential and existing constituents requires looking at the particular VNSA’s goals
and stage of development. Although the use of violence, in particular, terrorism,
has often been concluded to be an ineffective way of achieving goals (for example,
Blackburn 2002; Crenshaw 1995), a number of works have pointed to conditions
under which violence may in fact be effective (Abrahms 2008; Hoffman 1998; Pape
2005; Wilkinson 2000). Indeed, if ‘success’ is measured not as a full and complete
accomplishment of a VNSA’s apparent or declared aim (for example, full takeover
of a government, total change of a political or ideological system, complete
freedom of transport for an illicit good), but rather as partial accomplishment or
even just continuation of the VNSA’s existence and its daily functions, then
success through the use of violence has been shown to be quite effective (for
example, Harmon 2001; Kydd andWalter 2006). Although no precise criterion can
be set as a definite prescription for building up legitimacy, in terms of VNSAs
gaining initial recognition, there is little question that, in the modern era of 24-
hour media coverage, violent acts—the larger the better—generally gain the most
attention (Meadow 2009).
Finally, it should be pointed out that gaining recognition and legitimacy,
whether through violent or nonviolent means, has ramifications for both the
3 Pablo Escobar of the Medellin Cartel worked to build up his own ‘Robin Hood’
image by constructing hospitals and sports facilities (Escobar and Fisher 2009).
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representation and influence factors in this framework. In terms of influence,
legitimacy increases when states feel obliged to respond to and thus ‘recognize’
the VNSA—which will be discussed in more detail below.
Generating loyalty. While attracting new members involves building up
recognition and establishing legitimacy, the maintaining of these members can be
understood by asking whether the VNSA is able to generate necessary levels of
loyalty among its members. As with a term like ‘legitimacy’, ‘loyalty’ for members
of a VNSA should not be interpreted in any normative positive sense, but rather, is
intended to describe the degree and depth to which members feel connected to the
group. Depending on the nature of the VNSA and the motivations of its members
for belonging, the type of connection felt and therefore the levels of loyalty
engenderedwill vary. Broadly speaking, the greater the connection or ‘loyalty’ of a
VNSA’s members, the more that group will be able to maintain its representation,
and the greater its potential role may be in global politics.
The issue of loyalty also comes into question when considering the possibility
or potential of a broad power shift from states to nonstate actors, since one way of
looking at such a shift is to consider the strength of loyalty engendered by these
entities in their constituents, and the possibility of movement between them.
In other words, is it possible for individuals to maintain equal ‘dual loyalties’ to
both their state and some other nonstate entity, or is there a possibility of ‘shifting
loyalties’ paralleling (or preceding) a shift in polity power?
The argument has been made that traditional loyalties to state and nation are
under threat, as individuals shift loyalties to other entities—often NSAs with
broad social missions, such as Amnesty International, Doctors without Borders or
Greenpeace (Linklater 1996). The argument seems even stronger if we consider
not these modern products of global civil society but more ancient forms of
transnational identities, such as the Catholic Church, the Jihadist movement or
ethnic background. Ethnicity has been argued by some to be the principal
identification factor at the root of differences between groups (Gurr 1993), and
religion has been described as being at the core of individual and group identity
because of the ‘depth of commitment that religion often inspires and its capacity to
speak to the individual’s deepest existential concerns’ (Seul 1999, 568). The former
modern types of memberships are likely to accommodate dual loyalties; in other
words, it is possible to preserve statist loyalties while still experimenting with
these alternative new ones; some established or more traditional transnational
identities may be less accommodative, and may precede even the statist loyalty.
In most cases these older traditional ones also seem to go hand-in-hand with state
loyalties, but they may have a greater potential to shift loyalties away from the
state. So although people would rarely forsake their state in pursuing a loyalty to
Doctors without Borders (and normally would never be challenged to do this),
someonemight consider relinquishing some of their state loyalty for a loyalty they
have to a religious, ethnic or ideological identity (Baron 2009). With respect to
commitment, as well, the older types of identities seem to have the advantage over
newer ones. Among the new types, there are constantly different options that
might draw one’s interest and attention, whereas the old established types
maintain a monopoly. The rates of reshifting loyalties among the new groups
themselves is probably greater than among the older forms.
The point is that loyalty is an important factor for any actor, whether a state or
a nonstate. In light of questions of loyalty shift, it may be considered that some
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loyalties are stronger than others in their ability to produce a sustainable
representation. So in terms of ‘measuring’ the loyalty aspect of representation, we
should consider that some types of loyalties will be stronger than others. In the
realm of VNSAs, traditional, often ideological constructs are more likely to
produce sustainable loyalties than the modern actors of global civil society. The
earlier forms have, because of the nature of the ideology and the ancient
established norms and procedures, a greater regeneration capacity than more
recent forms.
Managing overstretch. Ironically, ‘success’ in the category of representation
may not be solely about attracting and keeping up membership, but also, in some
cases, about balancing those efforts with the equally risky potential effects of
excessive growth. In other words, with too much regeneration success, the VNSA
may become so large and diverse that it becomes difficult to manage effectively, or
that it loses the essence of its shared identity, and therefore the bindings that keep
it intact and functioning. Should the constituency of a VNSA grow to a point that it
becomes difficult both physically and ideologically to control, it could become
divided, with the possibility that its separate parts are thereby weakened and no
longer able to resist state persecution.
Obviously, the respective challenges of regeneration and overstretch are
different for each VNSA depending on the group’s particular aims and scope.
Those VNSAs with more narrowly focused scope and aims, for example, a local
warlord or an ethnic-based terrorist group, are less likely to face great risks of
overstretch. However, for VNSAs with global aims and scope, for example, the
Jihadists, whose mission requires broad, global regeneration efforts, the risks of
overstretch are a genuine factor to consider when assessing their global political
potential.
For states or empires, overstretch refers to the phenomenon that occurs when
they expand too much territorially. For the deterritorial VNSA, overstretch seems
to be a potential in two main ways. At the concrete organizational level, high
levels of expansion mean greater challenges in managing the organization’s
various parts in a secure way. Simply keeping distant cells or factions connected
for communication and exchange opens the VNSA up to easier security
establishment surveillance and penetration. More cells and factions also mean
increased chances of one group making mistakes that may again ease security
establishment countering efforts.
Overstretch may also occur on a more ideological level. First, with rapid
growth, it becomes more difficult for the VNSA to maintain operational
cohesiveness. With more members and subgroups, agreeing on common codes of
conduct, target selection, strategies and even what types of act are most
appropriate for achieving particular goals, all become more challenging. Possibly
most serious for the VNSA are overstretch issues of actual ideological
cohesiveness, since divergence on this front speaks to the very identity of the
group. Interesting examples of how a VNSA might face such ideological
cohesiveness issues and try to deal with them can be seen in the case of the
Jihadists. In their early recruitment initiatives during the 1980s in the camps in
Afghanistan, they were willing to ignore differences among the recruits, as the
movement grew around a presumed shared ideology of Islam. It quickly became
apparent, however, that the differences among these aspiring Jihadists from
around the globe could prove problematic. The Turkish Jihadists disapproved of
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the Yemeni or Saudi Jihadists’ religious conduct, and vice versa.4 To cope with this
problem, the al Qaeda leadership had to keep the various groups separated
physically into different camps and with different tasks and missions—while still
trying to keep them ideologically bound.
Overall, the factor of ‘Representation’ on the ARI constitutes a VNSA’s ability
to manage the fine tension between essential regeneration ability and controlling
overstretch in order to maintain organizational security and cohesiveness.
Without adequate regenerative capacity there will be no continuity, the VNSAwill
not be sustainable and it will not remain an actor. Maintaining such a regenerative
capacity may be accomplished based on an appeal to an inclusive spirit, such as
one based on religion or ideology, or even on a particular purpose (for example,
opposition to a political situation). The dilemma of course with such an ‘inclusive
spirit’ is that it must be broad enough to ensure a growing constituency, but
narrow enough to keep the actors’ members bound together and to allow for
reasonable management. For VNSAs with a global aim, ignoring the second part
of this balance may pose a genuine threat to the group. Moreover, the potential for
overstretch is likely to grow, as developments generally associated with
globalization, such as rapid advances in telecommunications and transportation,
while they ease the process of reaching out to larger audiences (good for
regeneration), also naturally may result in overly broad growth and expansion.
Influence
The third and final factor in this framework for understanding VNSAs’ global
potential draws on earlier frameworks’ inclusion of categories such as ‘ability’ to
employ policy instruments or to implement decisions, or simply ‘capacity’ and
‘capabilities’ to be able to make changes in policy. In this case, these practical
understandings are encompassed under the heading of ‘influence’. Under various
labels, ‘influence’ and the ability to exert it on the international environment is the
one criterion that has consistently been asserted as a definitional criterion for
nonstate actors: despite their broad range of activities and interests, all nonstate
actors are able to exert influence on the international environment through ‘agile
stateless and resourceful networks’ (Moses 2003, 29).
All NSAs, violent or otherwise, would claim to have influence, but assessing or
measuring this influence is a difficult task. As noted earlier, past work on NSAs
has tended to assess influence by looking for evidence of the NSA being a part of
international institutional arrangements and being able to act in ways that affect
the processes and outcomes in international politics (for example, Arts et al 2003).
These and similar legally based criteria clearly cannot be used directly to evaluate
the influence of violent NSAs since, with the exception of paid military
organizations, they cannot be a part of international institutional arrangements,
nor can they legally affect international politics. However, we can draw on these
ideas indirectly to argue that a VNSA could be considered to have ‘influence’ if it
showed evidence of a sustainable capacity, and if it constituted a transformative
and compelling challenge to states and the statist system. In essence, such a
4 Interview with Turkish Jihadist who served in Afghanistan, November 2001, in
Istanbul.
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definition of influence breaks down into two elements: sustainability and impact.
Each of these may be further divided, as shown in Table 3.
Sustainability. AVNSA’s successful sustainability may be linked to two main
features: (1) being based on a deterrent-free motivation, and (2) having adequate
flexibility and adaptability. The first main source of sustainability (see Table 3) is
linked to the underlying cause or purpose of the VNSA itself. For a violent NSA in
particular to be sustainable, given that it is likely to face at minimum resistance if
not overt persecution, its constituency must be motivated by a force that is
‘deterrent free’. In other words, the present and future members of this NSAmust
be driven by an idea that will continue to motivate them to action even in the face
of potentially extreme opposition from states. Recalling the characteristics of
‘illicit authority’, such strong motivation is most likely to stem from either money,
as in the case of VNSAs involved in criminal activities, or ideology, as in the case
of terrorist groups with divine or secular ideological principles. Of the two, both
are undoubtedly powerful, but financial motivation runs the risk of being ‘out-
bid’ by alternative sources, and is therefore less binding. As discussed above in the
section on gaining and maintaining members’ loyalty, ideological principles, in
particular religious-based ones, have been shown to be the deepest and most
binding, and therefore are arguably the most deterrent free.
The second aspect of sustainability is that of being flexible and adaptable.
In the face of formidable opposition from states, a VNSA is more likely to survive
if it is able and willing to make rapid and significant changes in everything from
its strategies and tactics to even its basic organizational principles and practices.
An example of how dramatic such changes might be can be seen in the case of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. This one-time secularist Palestinian
terrorist organization made an abrupt ideological shift after 2001, when it chose to
adopt a religious mission, a move made partly because of the realization that, with
a secularist ideology, it was failing to recruit suicide bombers for that was proving
to be the most influential means of action.
One way in which VNSAs may need to be flexible and adaptable is by using
the transnational space as a medium for basic functions crucial to sustainability—
for example, having sources of security, exchange and empowerment—since the
transnational space constitutes locations and means that are least accessible to
state regulation and control and therefore most convenient for VNSA activity.
Transnational space may include both physical spaces (for example, failed states)
and nonphysical ones (for example, cyberspace). A VNSA may resort to these
transnational spaces for security purposes (for example, to physically hide from
authorities), as well as for exchanging ideas, know-how, resources and so on. Such
exchanges may again be done in the physical transnational space (for example,
transferring money via couriers rather than banks) or the nonphysical (for
example, using the Internet for spreading ideas).
Table 3. Elements of VNSA influence
Sustainability Impact
Deterrent-resistant motivation Compulsion
Flexibility/adaptability Transformative capacity
A framework for violent nonstate actors 13
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:2
2 0
7 M
ay
 20
14
 
Yet another function that might most effectively take place in transnational
spaces and serve to increase sustainability is that of building up resources—in
other words, empowerment. The transnational space has become increasingly
more resourceful for empowerment and armament, an early example being the
AQ Khan network, showing how grey areas exist in transnational space and are
convenient for empowerment activities by VNSAs. Other examples can be seen in
small-scale armament. There are a reported 638 million illegal small arms in
circulation in the world today. They have been described as ‘cheap, widely
available, extremely lethal, simple to use, durable, portable, and concealable’
(Stohl 2005, 21), and are undoubtedly tempting for a VNSA seeking a short cut to
influence. Evidence of how the spread of such weapons has proven helpful to
VNSAs can be found in the countless numbers of Chinese and Egyptian AK47s
that were originally supplied to the Mujahidin during the Afghanistan war and
can now be found in the hands of violent extremists throughout the Middle East,
Africa and as far away as Southeast Asia (Boutwell 1998). In terms of evaluating a
VNSA’s sustainability, obviously the ultimate measure is whether it continues to
exist—even in a transformed state—and is able to carry out its activities, despite
whatever obstacles are put in its way.
Impact. The second main aspect of influence, impact, can also be further
divided into two characteristics: the degree to which the VNSA’s impact is
compelling, and the degree to which it is transformative. The first of these refers to
the idea of states being compelled to react to this nonstate entity. The VNSA’s
actions must be influential enough that states are unable to ignore it; in other
words, they must grant recognition to the VNSA—though not in the legal sense—
and in essence, in doing so, relinquish to it some of their own power. For
nonviolent NSAs, state recognition can be granted either explicitly or implicitly.
If the NSA’s position is not challenged by the state, the NSA can be viewed as
having implicit legitimacy in a particular issue area (de facto recognition). If states
go so far as to openly acknowledge that the NSA is actually better able to set policy
rules or guidelines in a particular area, they may grant explicit legitimacy and
recognition to the NSA (de jure recognition) (Hall and Biersteker 2002, 6). In either
case, there is evidence of ceding recognition to the NSA and providing it with
powers traditionally reserved to the state (Taylor 1997). Of course neither of the
above is an option for VNSAs, which must instead appeal to a third method:
creating such a disturbance that states cannot afford to be indifferent to them.
Such examples of states being compelled to react to VNSAs can be considered as
‘negative recognition’.
Interestingly, in such cases of VNSAs committing violent acts to seek ‘negative
recognition’, we can see a loose connection to the age-old war-making/state-
making argument (Tilly 1978, 1990), and thus a copying of age-old patterns of state
behaviour. Just as territorial entities waged more traditional wars to become
states, some VNSAs may wage asymmetric wars (with terror as the primary
method for this warfare5) to become fully recognized NSAs. As discussed earlier
in the section on building up legitimacy, the question of whether violence is an
effective means of action is a complex one. Ultimately, it cannot be answered
5 Since VNSAs are the weaker party in any conflict with states, a natural means for them
to use is terror—the ancient war-waging ‘weapon for the weak’ (Hoffman 1998, 4).
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without considering the VNSA’s particular goals. For a financially motivated
VNSA with global-level intent, nonviolent strategies may prove more effective
(see the comparison of the Cali and Medellin cartels’ use of violence in Williams
1994). For a politically motivated VNSA, however, violent acts are at least likely to
produce a state reaction and thus gain the VNSA recognition, the first step to
achieving political goals.6 Moreover, increasing the level or degree of violence
seems to lead to even greater negative recognition.
Suicide terror, for example, represents how greater violence can translate for
some groups into further compulsion and thus larger influence. Suicide terror
may be viewed as a reinvention by VNSAs of the arms technology race: a
consciously selected and purposeful strategy (Pape 2005). It has been argued that
‘terrorists have come to realize that the tactic of suicide terrorism increases their
success rate in attaining a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern
democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider
to be their homeland’ (4). In a sense, these terrorists have produced a powerful
alternative weapon: one with full dedication attached to it. With this weapon they
are able to achieve a level of influence in international relations that states cannot
easily reach despite all their organized resources. Further ratcheting up of
violence, indeed, the ultimate empowerment of VNSAs may come in the form of
seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). With access to WMDs, a VNSA
could potentially deny states the ability to provide their ‘primary responsibility’,
that is, security, to their citizens and thereby break down the state–society
relationship and shatter one of the primary reasons why the idea of state was first
conceived (Mendelsohn 2005). With more than 244 incidents of chemical or
biological terrorism having taken place in 26 countries since the First WorldWar, it
is not hard to believe claims of the inevitability that VNSAs will continue to seek
WMDs to increase their influence (Allison 2004, Tucker 2000). In terms of what
WMD possession would mean for the influence potential of a VNSA, it has been
said that it would represent ‘ultimate capability’ (Falkenrath 2000, 21), and, in the
case of a nuclear weapon in particular, would have an ‘extraordinary
psychological impact on the target audience’, that would immediately change
the status and image of the holder.
The second aspect to impact is that it must be transformative. This may mean
leading to changes in a state’s or states’ policies and practices (for example, in
border patrol, immigration policies, security measures) or to changes in a
particular state’s authority (for example, in the case of an insurgent group or
national-based terrorist organization creating an autonomous region or dividing a
country or overthrowing a government). Ultimately, a VNSAwith the greatest and
6 In cases where nonviolent groups have successfully negotiated political change, it has
to be recognized that the targeted states/societies have generally not come to the
negotiation table or decided to make concessions in a ‘nonviolent vacuum’. Rather, there is
usually a violent alternative group or the potential of the nonviolent group turning violent,
which leads them to change. In other words, the influence of the nonviolent group increases
because of the possibility of violent alternatives waiting in the wings, or the possibility of
the nonviolent actor becoming violent itself. For example, Sinn Fein was ‘better’ than the
IRA, Arafat gained acceptance in the presence of Hamas, the political wing of the Basque
separatists was preferred to the military one, and evenMartin Luther King could be seen as
having gained strength from his position as a better alternative to Malcolm X or the Black
Panthers.
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most global transformative influence would be one that presents such a credible
threatening capacity that it leads to transformations in the primary tenets of the
state-centric system (Hall and Biersteker 2002; Steinberg 2004). For example, it
might carry the potential to affect substantively the organizing principle of the
state-centric system, sovereignty, or major alignment patterns, or international
legal regime understandings or the distribution of capabilities within the state
system. With respect to the last of these, for example, it has been argued that
NSAs, by refusing to gather around any fixed pole, can play an important role in
making the notion of polarity obsolete (Pearlstein 2004). The question to be asked
when judging a VNSA’s ultimate transformative influence might be, therefore, is
the actor really challenging the principles of statehood and the state-centric
system?
VNSAs may certainly have a significant impact on that principle of
statehood—sovereignty (Nagan and Hammer 2004). Even the most developed
state may struggle when confronting the impact of a VNSA (Paul 2005), and state-
based international regimes and regulations are struggling to incorporate VNSA
challenges. Traditional international law and norms such as those prescribed
under the United Nations (UN) Charter concern themselves only with the use of
armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
independence of another state (Maogoto 2005). Because of this, states are now
forced to reevaluate the long-standing understanding that only a state has the
capacity to commit such an armed attack. Accordingly, one of the most pressing
issues has been whether the concept of armed attack pursuant to article 51 of the
UN Charter extends to attacks by VNSAs, in the absence of state complicity. Even
though the sovereignty debate is controversial, with some arguing that state
sovereignty is being eroded and others that it is being only transformed but is
ultimately resilient, that debate is of minimal importance here. Whether
sovereignty is being transformed or eroded, if it can be shown that an NSA,
particularly a violent one, may have a significant input in this change, then the
change alone would be evidence of the NSA’s influence. Basically, if a state—in
particular a powerful state—begins to act differently because of the actions of an
NSA, that NSA can be said to be an influential one at the global level and can be
considered to have greater potential for global actorness.
Future use of the ARI
In considering the potential actorness of VNSAs, a few initial points need to be
emphasized. First, NSA actorness in general cannot and should not be ignored.
NSAs existed long before states, they have continued to exist during the relatively
new era of statist hegemony and all evidence suggests that they will continue to
play a role in global affairs. Although debate will certainly continue over whether
NSAs will ever supersede states in terms of power and influence, there is no
question that NSAs have proven their capacity to remain a constant, influential
actor in global affairs.
Second, nonstate actorness is evolving, and the evolution of NSAs is serving to
help restructure global politics. These ‘sovereignty-free’ actors are not only able to
act autonomously, but also to act with a huge potential for innovative and
evolutionary capacity, giving them the potential to expand a political universe that
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was previously shaped by mostly statist practices. A transnationally expanding
political universe, in return, enlarges the political and physical contexts that
enable even further autonomy, representation and influence for the NSAs.
Finally, power, both in terms of its nature and the means for accessing it, has
also been transforming. Human-centric (as opposed to state-centric) entities, both
individuals and groups, are becoming increasingly powerful. In terms of their
means and mechanisms of power, NSAs clearly have not yet reached their limits.
For example, the combining of asymmetric strategies and approaches with the
means of nuclear weapons remains a possibility that has not yet been
materialized. With nonstate armament still in its youth, we cannot yet know the
limits of violent nonstate actorness potential, for using—or misusing—power.
Given the importance of NSAs, their changing nature, and their evolving role
in global politics, dynamic frameworks of analysis are needed both to trace the
historical trajectories in the evolution of violent nonstate actorness (preferably by
examining past cases with global claims, such as Anarchists, pirates and religious
extremists), but also to identify emerging patterns by examining modern-day
cases such as today’s Jihadists. With VNSAs likely to become more instrumental
actors of the statist game, such frameworks can also help us understand emerging
patterns of interaction among VNSAs and states (for example, alliances), which
are bound to become a crucial aspect for understanding present and future global
politics.
The ARI framework presented here aims to serve as a starting point to
achieving the above purposes. Using the ARI, single cases of violent nonstate
actorness can be assessed, and comparative case analyses can be made to identify
distinctions between different VNSAs and to offer insights into their relative
ability to ‘matter’ on a global level. The ARI provides a common structure
allowing for such cross analyses among VNSAs even when fundamental
differences exist in these groups’ objectives, goals or histories. For example, a
comparison of the Russian mafia with a terrorist group like the Jihadists might
reveal similar levels of autonomy but less representation potential for the Russian
mafia because it is financially motivated and its scope of potential recruits is more
limited. Moreover, since the mafia does not overtly go after the state system, it is
less of a threat and therefore may have less compulsion and transformative
capacity. Comparative historical case studies can explore changing patterns of
evolution and progress within violent nonstate actorness. Or, taking again the
example of the modern-day Jihadists, but in this case comparing them with the
nineteenth/twentieth century-Anarchists might reveal answers to such questions
as why the Anarchists, when sent into exile, were unable to regroup their
constituency, whereas the Jihadists were able to turn the most remote exiles into
an advantage—arguably even into a strategy for developing further autonomy.
Such a comparison might also provide insights into the extent of the overstretch
risk potential, by showing what has happened over the past century to the
common identity of the Anarchists, and what the implications of this change have
been on the group’s influence.
The ARI framework may also make it possible to assess the changing global
context by seeing how various contextual inputs qualitatively affect autonomy,
representation and influence, the building blocks of evolving VNSA actorness.
Global contextual factors can be assessed and categorized more easily and
effectively within the ARI framework, for example, determining which specific
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dimensions of globalization, from communications to accessibility to weapons,
are having the greatest effect on NSAs’ autonomy, representation and influence.
Drawing on the subitemized categories of the ARI framework may also
provide insights into which of these (autonomy, representation, influence) are
comparatively more important for making significant leaps in establishing the
actorness of an NSA in global politics. For example, is autonomy more important
than representation? Can an NSA have influence without established
representation? The ARI framework may not only provoke such questions, but
also provide a means of trying to assess answers to them.
Finally, such insights into the evolutionary patterns of VNSAs and assessments
about which factors may be most important in establishing a VNSA’s actorness,
may also help in assessing individual VNSA cases and then designing effective
countering strategies. Such analyses may begin to help states cope with the
dilemma they often face, namely, that countering strategies designed and
conducted as emergency responses rather than carefully analysed ‘root cause’
responses, are themselves likely to feed into the autonomy, representation and
influence potential of the VNSA. The ARI framework might allowmore long-term
(root cause) responses by structuring focused analyses of how to address a
particular VNSA’s autonomy, representation and influence.
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